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After US Treasury Secretary James Baker expressed a distinct lack of enthuasiasm, on Sept. 8
Brazilian Finance Minister Luis Carlos Bresser Pereira announced his government would withdraw
its proposal to convert half of Brazil's $68 billion commercial bank debt into discounted bonds. Baker
called the bond plan a "nonstarter." A Treasury spokesperson said the morning meeting between
Baker and Bresser Pereira produced "general agreement that Brazil's problems should be addressed
in a conventional way."
Although never fully refined after Bresser Pereira first discussed it last week, the plan rejected by
the Treasury required that foreign banks, which Brazil owes about $80 billion, convert half their
loans into long-term, fixed interest bonds that would be sold to investors at prevailing discounts for
Brazilian debt. That debt now sells for about 55% of face value, so the banks faced writing off about
$20 billion on the half of the debt that they would convert to securities. That figure alone alarmed
the banks, which have recently been setting aside funds to cover potential losses on their Third
World loans. The banks believed that other countries would be forced to demand similar terms for
domestic political reasons. [The talks with Brazil appeared to be opening a new chapter in the Third
World debt crisis.
Baker has recently made room for a "menu of options" approach to negotiating debt accords, and
the Brazil discussions made special note of one called "exit bonds." The exit bond plan, which was
used in a recent debt agreement with Argentina, allows the banks to buy from the countries bonds
that they can then sell to investors. The bonds offer a way out for banks that no longer want to lend
to developing countries, although they do take a loss on the loans.]
Treasury officials apparently made a distinction between exit bonds to which banks would be
free to subscribe as they wished and the kind of unilateral, non-negotiable proposition offered by
Brazil. The Brazilian minister told reporters after the meeting in Washington and later in Brasilia
that he would instead propose to the banks a "voluntary" system of discounting Brazilian debt
through the so-called exit bonds. He also reiterated that his government will not seek a formal
standby agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) prior to renegotiating the debt with
commercial banks.
The Treasury's statement following the meeting said: "Secretary Baker had a full and frank
discussion of Brazil's economic and financial situation, including its relations with its creditors, with
Minister Bresser Pereira. "There was general agreement that Brazil's problem should be addressed
in a conventional way and both parties agreed to continue to consult closely toward that end. There
was discussion of Brazil's plan to develop a menu of options for its bank-financing package, but
Secretary Baker characterized Brazil's reported debt proposal to securitize existing debt as a non©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute
All rights reserved.

Page 1 of 3

LADB Article Id: 76164
ISSN: 1060-4189

starter. "With respect to possible Paris Club action, Secretary Baker and Minister Bresser Pereira
understood that Paris Club rescheduling would require a formal IMF standby agreement."
In a telephone interview with the WASHINGTON POST, Brazilian Ambassador Marcilio Marques
Moreira, who participated in the discussions with Baker, said the proposal was dropped because
"there was a sense that maybe it had been misperceived or misrepresented. So he (Bresser Pereira)
rethought the same idea, stressing that it was a voluntary solution." Ambassador Marques Moreira
reiterated that Brazil still opposed following an IMF economic program as a condition for new
commercial bank loans. But banking sources said IMF participation was considered vital to any debt
restructuring agreement.
Without new money from the IMF, they noted, Brazil soon will have to begin repayments of $1
billion a year to that multilateral lender. "The banks are not keen to put money into Brazil so that
the IMF can get repaid," said one banking source. Commercial bankers were less enthusiastic about
the termination of the bond plan, which some speculated had been a trial balloon. Most contended
Brazil was a long way from agreeing to a conventional debt-restructuring package of new money in
return for economic changes.
Many analysts speculated that the Brazilian proposal was a part of the complex political
environment in the country and the flagging leadership of President Jose Sarney. William R.
Cline, an economist at the Institute for International Economics told the NEW YORK TIMES, "It is
essentially a political issue." Brazil is better off than a lot of the other debtors, Cline added. He and
other analysts said Brazil's tough stance might have been an attempt to compensate for politically
unpopular belt-tightening measures required to stabilize the economy. Bresser Pereira's turnaround
came after a weekend international debt conference in Vienna at which the bond plan was poorly
received by bankers who were present, and just weeks before Brazil is to begin talks on resuming
payments with its large commercial lenders in late September.
Bresser Pereira has sent his top aides to Britain, other European nations and Japan this month
to meet with bankers and government officials. Other deadlines also may have affected Bresser
Pereira's new position: The international financial world will gather in Washington late this month
for the annual meeting of the IMF and the World Bank. A committee of federal regulators, meeting
at the end of October, is expected to consider ordering US banks to transfer funds from their loanloss reserves to a special mandated reserve on the grounds that a portion of the Brazilian debt is
uncollectible. Such a move would reduce banks' capital, but would have no impact on earnings
unless existing reserves are insufficient.
Brazil suspended payments on about $70 billion of private bank debt on February 28. The country's
total foreign is estimated at $112 billion. Brasilia still hopes to negotiate new commercial loans of
about $7.2 billion, at interest rates equaling the banks' cost of funds, a plan Brazil announced in July.
Bankers have warned that this plan would induce other debtor nations to reopen agreements to seek
easier terms. In Washington on Sept. 9, the Agence France Presse reported that IMF administrators
were "examining" a report on Brazil's economic situation prepared by a single Fund employee
during a recent visit in Brasilia. The report apparently focused on the country's exchange policy and
external accounts.
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Next, AFP reported that an informed source who requested anonymity stated that if Argentina
toughens its foreign debt payment policy, Brazil could stand to benefit in its future negotiations.
The same source said the Peronist victory in Argentina's Sept. 6 elections is viewed by the financial
community with a "certain trepidation" since the Peronists have long advocated debt payment
moratorium. Argentina indirectly benefitted from the Brazilian payment suspension in February,
said the source. Buenos Aires obtained more favorable payment conditions this year from creditor
banks who feared that President Raul Alfonsin's government would follow Brasilia's bad example.
On Sept. 9, at a press conference in Brasilia, Bresser Pereira said that "creative solutions" to the debt
problem were necessary to enable Brazil to resume its payment obligations. A Finance Ministry
official, who requested anonymity, told the AP that the Brazilian government was "not satisfied"
with Baker's response because he simply refused to consider the bond proposal as a starting point
for negotiations with the bankers.
A statement by President Jose Sarney indicated that the outcome of Bresser Pereira's meeting with
Baker served to clarify certain questions for both sides, but that it was apparent for Brazil that any
future debt negotiations must be grounded on "creative" solutions and conditions that reflect when
the country will be capable of resuming payments. The note also said that the Brazilian proposal for
converting the debt into government bonds would have to be adopted voluntarily by a large number
of banks. Moreover, the eventual total of debt to be converted would not necessarily be half of the
commercial debt as was proposed to Baker.
Bresser Pereira refused to provide details on what appears to be a modified plan, nor the projected
sum now proposed for conversion. The formal proposal will be presented Sept. 25 in Washington
at the annual IMF-World Bank meeting and later to the committee representing the country's
commercial bank creditors. The minister said, "Our proposal will be intelligent, creative, new...We
must repeat that the proposal presented to Baker was merely a general idea." Bresser Pereira
also reiterated that Brazil wants the spread rate premium charged by the banks over the interest
rate for handling high-risk loans reduced from the present 1.125% to zero. He added that Brazil
will continue to insist on an agreement with the commercial banks before entering into a formal
agreement with the IMF. (Basic data from WASHINGTON POST, 09/09/87; NEW YORK TIMES,
09/09/87; AFP, 09/09/87; AP, 09/09/87)
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